Depósito Digital de Documentos de la UAB Encontrados 14 registros  1 - 10siguiente  ir al registro: La búsqueda tardó 0.02 segundos. 
1.
41 p, 433.1 KB On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness / Arribillaga, R. Pablo (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis (Argentina)) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis (Argentina))
We characterize the set of all obviously strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. Since obvious strategy-proofness implies strategy-proofness, and the set of strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on this domain coincides with the class of generalized median voter schemes, we focus on this class. [...]
2020 - 10.1016/j.jet.2020.104992
Journal of economic theory, Vol. 186 (2020) , p. 104992  
2.
31 p, 377.9 KB Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous / Bergantiños, Gustavo (Universidade de Vigo) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis (Argentina))
We study individually rational rules to be used toallot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisiblegood that is freely available only in whole units. Arule is individually rational if, at each preferenceprofile, each agent finds that her allotment is at leastas good as any whole unit of the good. [...]
2021 - 10.1111/jpet.12492
Journal of public economic theory, Vol. 23 Núm. 2 (2021) , p. 376-401  
3.
24 p, 560.3 KB Foundations of pseudomarkets : walrasian equilibria for discrete resources / Miralles, Antonio (Miralles Asensio) (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Centre per a l'Estudi de les Organitzacions i de les Decisions Econòmiques) ; Pycia, Marek (University of Zurich)
We study the assignment of discrete resources in a general model encompassing a wide range of applied environments, such as school choice, course allocation, and refugee resettlement. We allow single-unit and general multi-unit demands and any linear constraints. [...]
Academic Press Inc., 2021 - 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105303
Journal of economic theory, Vol. 196 (2023) , p. 105303  
4.
34 p, 745.6 KB Unemployment risks and intra-household insurance / Fernández-Blanco, Javier (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
To study the constrained efficient public insurance provision against unemployment risks, we build a directed search model with households where a spouse's ability to provide consumption insurance determines the risks job-seekers take on. [...]
2022 - 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105477
Journal of economic theory, Vol. 203 (july 2022) , p. 105477  
5.
8 p, 434.8 KB On commodity tax harmonization and public goods provision / Kotsogiannis, Christos (CESIfo) ; López García, Miguel Ángel (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia Aplicada)
This paper argues that Pareto improvements based on harmonizing tax reforms expressed in terms of the divergence between actual and optimal tax structures and over/under provision of public goods require the use of 'pseudo-optimal' taxes instead of optimal ones. [...]
2021 - 10.1111/jpet.12535
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2021  
6.
13 p, 280.7 KB Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations / Alcalde, José (Universitat d'Alacant) ; Pérez-Castrillo, David (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) ; Romero Medina, Antonio (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
We implement the stable correspondence of a job matching market in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. We use a simple sequential mechanism in which firms propose a salary to each worker (first stage) and, then, each worker accepts at most one proposal (second stage). [...]
1998 - 10.1006/jeth.1997.2447
Journal of economic theory, Vol. 82 Núm. 2 (octubre 1998) , p. 469-480  
7.
35 p, 428.9 KB Matching Markets under (In)complete Information / Ehlers, Lars (Université de Montréal) ; Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona)
We introduce incomplete information to centralized many-to-one matching markets. This is important because in real life markets (i) any agent is uncertain about the other agents' true preferences and (ii) most entry-level matching is many-to-one (and not one-to-one). [...]
2015 - 10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.008
Journal of economic theory, Vol. 157 (2015) , p. 295-314  
8.
33 p, 477.2 KB On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Nicolò, Antonio (University of Manchester) ; Sen, Arunava (Indian Statistical Institute) ; Sharma, Tradib (Centro de Investigación Económica (México)) ; Ülkü, Levent (Centro de Investigación Económica (México))
We study efficiency and fairness properties of the equal cost sharing with maximal participation (ECSMP) mechanism in the provision of a binary and excludable public good. According to the maximal welfare loss criterion, the ECSMP is optimal within the class of strategyproof, individually rational and no-deficit mechanisms only when there are two agents. [...]
2015 - 10.1016/j.jet.2014.11.003
Journal of economic theory, Vol. 155 (2015) , p. 30-49  
9.
39 p, 288.8 KB On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game : limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria / Massó, Jordi (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Departament d'Economia i d'Història Econòmica) ; Neme, Alejandro (Universidad Nacional de San Luis)
We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. [...]
2014 - 10.1016/j.jet.2014.09.016
Journal of economic theory, Vol. 154 (2014) , p. 185-215  
10.
11 p, 143.5 KB Measuring social polarization with ordinal and categorical data / Permanyer, Iñaki (Centre d'Estudis Demogràfics) ; D'Ambrosio, Conchita (Université du Luxembourg)
We examine the measurement of social polarization with categorical and ordinal data. We partition the society into groups on the basis of salient social characteristics, such as race and ethnicity, and we take into account the extent to which these groups are clustered in certain regions of an attribute's distribution. [...]
2015 - 10.1111/jpet.12093
Journal of public economic theory, Vol. 17 Núm. 3 (June 2015) , p. 311-327
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Depósito Digital de Documentos de la UAB : Encontrados 14 registros   1 - 10siguiente  ir al registro:
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